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Substance and Procedure in the Reform of Criminal
Sentencing
Franklin E. Zimring*
There are three installments to this short essay. The first section creates a
1
classification of types of reform. The second section outlines two recent changes
2
in California sentencing. The third section discusses four lessons about the
proper evaluation of changes in punishment that are derived from recent
3
experience in California. In the first section, I distinguish between the means
used to change the rules of sentencing and the substantive objectives that reforms
4
attempt to achieve. The ends of sentencing reform are why changes are made;
the means of sentencing reform are how the rules are changed. The how of
sentencing changes is an objective reality that is usually not difficult to
determine. The authority to set prison terms is shifted from parole board to
5
sentencing judge, or from judge to jury. The objectives of sentencing reforms are
the consequences intended by the people who designed or authorized changes in
the rules. These are motives that may not be easy to determine and also may not
6
be shared by all those persons who design and authorize a particular change.
Some of those who shifted power from parole boards to judges may have
7
intended that the average length of prison terms might be reduced while others
intended that the uncertainty and disparity in sentences might be reduced but
8
without any change in average length. While reform objectives are more difficult

* Franklin E. Zimring is the William G. Simon Professor of Law at the University of California,
Berkeley. His prior work on sentencing includes The Scale of Imprisonment (1991) and Prison Population and
Criminal Justice Policy in California (1992), both with Gordon Hawkins, and Reform and Punishment: Essays
on Criminal Sentencing (1983) edited with Michael Tonry,
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to
the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2005) (stating that the five common decision makers in
criminal sentencing are “judges, juries, legislatures, sentencing commissions, and parole boards”).
6. See In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 924 (1972) (stating that the goal of indeterminate sentencing is to use
shorter sentences and reform the offender). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2015) (declaring the
Legislature’s purpose for sentencing is punishment and terms should be determined by seriousness of the
offense). See also CAL. R. CT. 4.410 (combining the goal of deterring future offenses along with aim to punish
defendant as “general objectives in sentencing”).
7. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals 1989–90, 79 GEO. L.J. 1162, 1165 (1991) (explaining that the sentencing judge may have
discretion to release prisoners early to parole, which generally issues early release).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2008) (allowing a judge to consider factors in determining what terms to
impose in supervised release). See also O’Hara, supra note 7, at 1163–64 (stating that under the Sentencing
Reform Act a prisoner must serve his sentence, but the judge can use discretion in determining post-release
requirements on the prisoner).
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9

to determine and often not uniformly intended by those who supported changes,
we must determine both the ends and the means employed to achieve them to
effectively evaluate whether reforms succeed I. Definitions and Categories in
Sentencing Reform
The key terms in this essay are substance and procedure in criminal
sentencing. The substantive content of a criminal sentencing scheme are the types
10
and amounts of punishment the system attaches to criminal convictions. The
procedures of sentencing concern how punishment decisions are made and
11
reviewed.
One important threshold question is whether the distinction between
substance and procedure is simply a repetition of the earlier distinction between
the ends and the means of sentencing reform. Are not procedures simply the
means used to produce punishment decisions rather than legal arrangements with
12
independent substantive value? The correct answer to this question is no,
because often the choice of procedures is a matter of importance to judgments
about justice in punishment and also frequently procedures are a central target of
13
reform efforts. If better or less arbitrary procedures are frequent objectives of
reform, then procedural features of punishment policy are often both the means
and the ends of the reform. There are also a large number of cases in which a
14
substantive legal change is the means selected to achieve a substantive reform.
The method used to end the death penalty, for example, is simply to remove state
15
killing from the list of authorized legal punishments.

9. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
749 (2006) (stating there is little agreement about definition of uniformity in sentencing or how to attain it).
10. See United States v. Granda, 555 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating the purpose of criminal law is
to “conform conduct to the norms expressed in that law”).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c) (West Supp. 2015) (requiring courts to state the reason for its
sentence choice at the time of sentencing). See also People v. Jackson, 242 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(explaining that trial courts needed to state the reasons for sentence terms to allow appellate courts to ensure
lower courts not misusing facts while imposing a sentence).
12 . See Shannon Broderick, Blakely v. Washington Confuses Federal Courts: A Look into the
Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 244 (2005) (detailing how prior
criminal sentences were based on a system created by the legislature, disparately enforced by judges, and time
determined by a parole commission).
13. See id. at 244–45 (describing how federal sentencing reform that established guidelines designed to
institute fair sentences that evaluated the criminal not just the crime charged).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (West 2012) (increasing sentencing terms based on the criminal
history and type of crime committed). But see Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for Wholesale
Reform of California’s Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 907–08 (2004) (highlighting
that studies show lack of support for claim that Three Strikes law has reduced crime in California).
15. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–240 (1972) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional as
applied, leading to defacto a five year moratorium on capital punishment in the United States). See also William
Claiborne, Ill. Governor, Citing Errors, Will Block Executions, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-01/31/079r-013100-idx.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting the Illinois governor imposed a death penalty moratorium to allow inquiry into why more
death row inmates have "been exonerated than executed").
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Table 1 provides a two-by-two scheme that identifies four distinct modes of
sentencing reform.
Table 1. Four Types of Sentencing Reform
Ends

Means

Procedure

Substance

Procedure

1

2

Substance

3

4

The four varieties of sentencing reforms differ in the type of method for
reform and the type of objective. Type 1 is the use of procedural methods of
reform to produce a procedural objective of reform. The federal sentencing
commission which was established in the 1980s to reduce disparate sentences
produced when individual federal district court judges sentenced offenders
16
convicted in their courts is a prominent recent example of Type 1 reform. Type
2 reform changes the procedures of sentencing with the objective of altering the
distribution of punishments that the system will generate. One example is
requiring a unanimous jury verdict of death in a penalty trial, or judge and jury
17
concurrence, or both, before a death sentence can be imposed. This procedural
shift is usually an attempt to reduce the number and proportion of death
18
sentences. A second example of Type 2 reform is so-called “truth in sentencing”
provisions, which require a minimum proportion of a nominal sentence to be
19
served before the prisoner can be released through parole power. The usual

16. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012).
17. See People v. Miranda, 744 P.2d 1127, 1152 (Cal. 1987) (requiring that jury unanimously agree
before imposing the death penalty); State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 399 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that “jury
verdict on punishment must be unanimous”); State v. Leonard, 818 N.E.2d 229, 262 (Ohio 2004) (holding that a
“verdict of life imprisonment is required to be unanimous).
18. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 452 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that jury
unanimity promotes full deliberation and decision “will reflect the conscience of the community”). See also
State v. Daniels, 542 A.2d 306, 389 (Conn. 1988) (finding that requiring a unanimous verdicts induces thorough
jury deliberations); State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39 (N.C. 1995) (requiring a unanimous decision
“prevents the jury from evading its duty”).
19. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1–3 (JAN. 1999).
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objective here is to lengthen the imprisonment term served by the offenders who
20
are targets of these provisions.
There are also a large number of what I call Type 4 reforms in the history of
21
sentencing reform. The removal of particular forms of punishment regarded as
too harsh—death, whipping, life without possibility of parole—are one group of
Type 4 reforms. Type 4 reforms also include requiring punishments that are not
grossly disproportionate to the offender’s culpability.
But are there real-world examples of Type 3 reforms, where a substantive
change in the punishments available in the law is the method of reform and yet
the objective of the reform is procedural? Probably yes. The U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Furman v. Georgia prohibited death sentences in 35 states that gave
22
the power to juries without standards to govern the choice. To remove the
23
problematic procedures, the possibility of the death sentence was eliminated. If
this characterization of Furman rationale is accepted, then the majority rule
24
would constitute a Type 3 reform. But if the real motive of those who joined the
majority was eliminating the death penalty, then both the means and the ends of
25
decision would be substantive and Furman would be a Type 4 reform.
A similar issue was generated by the condemned prisoner’s argument before
26
the Supreme Court in McGautha v. California in 1970. The prisoner argued that
jury discretion to choose between prison and death was fundamentally lawless,
and sought to remedy the procedural problem by eliminating the possible choice
27
of death. But the clear motive of those pressing the argument was eliminating
28
the death penalty, so from their perspective, the attempt was a Type 4 reform.

20. Id. at 3–4.
21. Andrew H. Malcolm, More and More, Prison is America’s Answer to Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/26/weekinreview/the-nation-more-and-more-prison-is-america-s-answerto-crime.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the
Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 68 (1992) (discussing the evolution of proportionality in criminal
punishment over time).
22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–240 (1972).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that the statutes allowing complete jury discretion in
death penalty sentencing to be “unconstitutional in their operation” but leaving open the possibility of
mandatory death penalty sentences). Each of the Justices forming the majority wrote their own concurring
opinion. Two justices joined on the procedural basis that the discretion afforded to the jury was
unconstitutional, two justices felt that the death penalty as a whole was “cruel and unusual punishment,” and
Douglas’ concurring opinion is on the fence. Id. at 291.
25. See id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I would not hesitate to hold . . . that death is today a ‘cruel
and unusual’ punishment, were it not that death is a punishment of longstanding usage and acceptance in this
country”).
26. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185 (1971).
27. Id. at 196.
28. See id. Although the prisoners were arguing against the procedural aspects of capital punishment
sentencing, namely the complete discretion afforded to juries in imposing such sentences, the procedure argued
against was so jurisdictionally widespread that the argument was one against the death penalty on the whole. Id.
at 203.
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I. THE CLASSIFICATION OF DISPARITY REDUCTIONS
One frequent objective of changes in sentencing procedure is to reduce the
extent to which similar crimes and offenders receive different criminal
29
punishments. The reduction of disparate punishments was a prominent objective
30
of the creation of federal and state sentencing commissions, of appellate review
31
32
of sentencing, and of devices like parole guidelines. Is the reduction of
disparity better regarded as a procedural or a substantive objective? In its pure
form, that is to say, as an attempt to reduce only the variance in punishments but
not the total or average penalty, I would characterize the objective of disparity
reduction as a procedural rather than substantive goal, but the issue has no
obviously correct solution.
II. A TALE OF TWO CALIFORNIA “REALIGNMENTS”
The recent history of incarceration policy in California provides two case
studies in why the correct classification of the goals of sentencing reform is
necessary, and also why it is frequently difficult.
The most famous shift in correctional policy in California is also the most
33
recent. Faced with a federal court demand to reduce crowding in the state
prisons, the executive branch of California government designed a program in
2011 to shift persons who had been previously committed for nonviolent felonies
and parolees who had previously been returned to the state prisons to the
34
jurisdiction and the facilities of county governments.
While the prisoners and attorneys who brought the original lawsuit desired
both better conditions of confinement in all custodial settings and reduction in
35
levels of confinement, neither of these goals were an explicit statewide element

29. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals
for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
30. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012) (“The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to
establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that . . . provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . .”).
31. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 4–5 (2008).
32. Dhammika Dharmapala et. al, Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion
Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1037, 1040, 1044 (2010).
33. DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL, RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP:
CORRECTIONS 5 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/ R_811DMR.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2010 WL
99000, at *4 (E.D. & N.D. Cal. 2010).
34. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 33, at 5.
35. See Coleman, 2010 WL 99000, at *1–2 (E.D. & N.D. Cal. 2010).
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36

in the realignment plan. Instead, the plan proponents advertised it as an attempt
to reduce the population of the state facilities by shifting responsibilities to local
37
levels of government. If this is taken at face value, is it an attempt to change the
setting for confinement, but not the terms of confinement served by individual
offenders nor the aggregate number of persons behind bars in the state. This
would seem to be what Table 1 would call a “Type 1” reform, where procedures
are the means of change and where the objectives of the reform are also
procedural. One cannot even argue that the objective of the reform is to improve
the conditions of confinement for all incarcerated offenders, since only crowding
38
and conditions in the state level facilities were prioritized in the state plan.
There were, however, two aspects of the design of the adult system
realignment that are consistent with a theory that those who designed the
program anticipated and probably desired a reduction in overall levels of secure
39
confinement in California. While local governments were given additional
responsibility for offenders previously incarcerated in state prisons, the counties
were not required to hold these offenders in secure confinement and the financial
support the state provides under the program gives counties some incentive to
40
pocket the money rather than expand their facilities and lengthen stays. So
while the program was announced as a Type 1 reform, it may well have been
designed as a Type 2 reform, where lower total combined populations were
anticipated and desired. Clearly, one major issue in measuring the impact of the
prison realignment program will be its effect on total confinement, and this will
require a detailed profile of the mix of types and lengths of confinement for
41
felons, parole failures, and misdemeanants in California’s prisons and jails.
The mixed signals and ambiguous incentives of the 2011 program make it
hazardous to paste a clear Type 1 or Type 2 label on the statewide program. It is
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230.1 (enacted by 2011-12 Stat. Ch. 15) (requiring counties to submit a
realignment plan that addresses various programs but does not specifically address prison conditions).
37. Id.
38. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 1, 2 (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/110914_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf. But see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 17.5(b) (enacted by 2011-12 Stat. Ch. 15) (stating that provisions to reduce recidivism “are not intended
to alleviate state prison overcrowding”).
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(2)(enacted by 2011-12 Stat. Ch. 15) (finding that despite increased
prison spending, reincarnation rates increased); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(3) (enacted by 2011-12 Stat. Ch.
15) (stating that policies to build more prisons will not provide better public safety).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4016.5(a)(2) (amended by 2011-12 Stat. Ch. 15)
41. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHAB., FACT SHEET: 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: THE
CORNERSTONE OF CALIFORNIA’S SOLUTION TO REDUCE PRISON OVERCROWDING, COSTS AND RECIDIVISM 3
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/realignment-fact-sheet.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (determining which prisoners would be sent to county jail and which would not
based on their sentenced offenses). See also MAGNUS LOFSTROM, ET AL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF
CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS ON REALIGNMENT PUBLIC SAFETY, PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL. 10–11 (Aug. 2012),
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/ report/R_812MLR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(assessing realignment’s impact on county jail populations by looking at length of time inmates are kept in
county jails).
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likely that different counties will produce different patterns of how much
increased custody at the county level offsets the net reduction in the county’s
state prisoners. So the effective level of government for determining whether the
program is best viewed as a Type 1 or Type 2 reform might well be the county
level.
It is too early to provide anything but projections on the impact of
realignment on total incarceration.
Petersilia and Snyder comment on the current projections in a 2013 analysis:
. . . will we simply have substituted jail for prisons? According to CDCR,
the prison population is projected to level out at around 128,000 by June
2013, reaching 131,000 by 2018. The jail population is now at about
78,000 inmates and is projected to reach 108,000 by 2017 . . . the total
population for prison and jail combined is projected to increase to
231,756 by 2015. This is nearly the same number of offenders in prison
42
and jail in June 2010, right before realignment passed.
A. The Juvenile Realignment of 1996
The second California “realignment” is less well known but is also an
43
important reform. While there are substantial similarities between the state’s
2011 adult realignment and the legal and financial strategies used 15 years earlier
44
to alter patterns of juvenile incarceration, the juvenile program was both
designed and intended to reduce the secure confinement of juvenile offenders
45
statewide. Prior to 1996, the juvenile courts in California counties had shortterm custodial facilities to detain juveniles either before or after adjudication and
usually also “camps” or other secure residential facilities for post-adjudication
46
confinement. The duration of a juvenile’s stay in these county facilities was
under the control of county government, either judges or probation staff. A
juvenile court judge could also commit an adjudicated delinquent to the
California Youth Authority (CYA), a state government agency that maintained
secure facilities and also determined how long a committed offender would stay
42. Joan Petersilia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: Ten Questions Everyone Should
Ask about California Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. OF POLITICS & POL'Y 266, 305–306 (2013).
43. BARRY KRISBERG, ET AL., BERKELEY CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A NEW ERA IN CALIFORNIA
JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM 2, (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/New_Era.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
44. Compare 2011 Realignment Legislation Addressing Public Safety, § 636, 5 Stat. 327 (2011-12)
(stating there must be a “community corrections grant program to help implement the act”), with CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 912 (amended by 1996 Stat. Ch. 6) (requiring counties to pay per juvenile incarcerated with the
Department of Youth Authority).
45. See Krisberg, et al., supra note 43, at 12.
46. DAVID STEINHART & JEFFREY A. BUTTS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., YOUTH CORRECTIONS IN
CALIFORNIA 2 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410529_cayouthcorrections.Pdf?q=
costeffective-youth-corrections (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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before release. The terms of confinement in the California Youth Authority
were much longer than stays in county facilities, and there were no major
48
financial disincentives to high rates of CYA commitment prior to 1996.
The 1996 realignment was an attempt to shift correctional responsibility from
state level to county level facilities and also to reduce total juvenile
49
confinement. The mix of financial carrots and sticks in the juvenile realignment
50
was a visible attempt to reduce incarceration. Counties that sent non-dangerous
offenders to the CYA had to pay for this policy, while county efforts to find both
custodial and noncustodial programs in-county were eligible for state financial
51
assistance. While the shift from state to county responsibility in the 2011
realignment could be advertised as neutral on the issue of total custodial
confinement in the state, the juvenile realignment was clearly focused on
52
reducing the number of juveniles confined and the length of their confinement.
So this was a textbook case of Type 2 sentencing reform, changing the financial
53
consequences of state and local custody in an attempt to reduce incarceration.
The impact of the 1996 and subsequent efforts in the juvenile system was
54
dramatic. The number of persons confined in the California Youth Authority
55
fell by over 90% in 15 years, from slightly more than 10,000 to fewer than 800.
And this massive shift away from the CYA did not have any visible impact on
56
county-level custodial confinement.
57
Figure 1 shows the decline in CYA population, an aggregate total of 9,000.
58
Figure 2 shows levels of county-level custody and this is stable in the aggregate.
Both figures are taken from Aurélie Ouss’ draft Financing Structures and
59
Criminal Justice Organization, where they were Figures 7 and 6 respectively.

47. Id. at 15.
48. KRISBERG, ET AL., supra note 43, at 6–7
49. JEFFREY A. BUTTS & DOUGLAS N. EVANS, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CITY UNIV. OF
N.Y., RESOLUTION, REINVESTMENT, AND REALIGNMENT: THREE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 22 (2011).
50. KRISBERG, ET AL., supra note 43, at 12.
51. Id.
52. BUTTS & EVANS, supra note 49, at 22.
53. See supra Part I for a definition of Type 2 Reform. In this case, financial incentives and disincentives
were used to spur sentencing of juvenile offenders at the shorter-term local level. See supra text accompanying
note 51.
54. KRISBERG, ET AL., supra note 43, at 17.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Aurélie Ouss, Financing Structures and Criminal Justice Organization 24 (Feb. 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with McGeorge Law Review).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Figure 1. Number of Inmates in California’s State Juvenile Facilities,
1995–2005.

Source: Monthly reports of number of inmates in California juvenile
facilities; from Ouss, 2014.
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Figure 2. One-Day Count of Juveniles in State and Local Facilities,
1997–2010.

Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement; from Ouss, 2014.
Does this mean the entire reduction in CYA population was translated into a
net reduction in statewide confinement?
st
Not quite. First, after the turn of the 21 century there was a national
60
reduction in rates of juvenile confinement, so that the relatively stable county
level numbers from California might have been declines but for the population
absorbed from the CYA. Second, the aggregate county-level commitments
reported statewide in Figure 2 might be masking real differences in different
61
counties. It is unlikely that there are counties in California that maintained their
pre-1996 levels of total commitment, but there are probably very substantial
differences between counties in the extent of total declines.
The radical downsizing of the CYA is a clear example of Type 2 reforms
with statewide impact, but the detailed assessment of the extent of changes in
different types of county facilities awaits more detailed study.

60. BUTTS & EVANS, supra note 49, at 2.
61. Compare VENTURA COUNTY GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF
VENTURA CNTY. 125, 127 (1997), available at http://vcportal.ventura.org/GDJ/docs/reports/1997-98/report
_ljps_juvenileJusticeSystem.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), with ORANGE CNTY. PROB. DEP’T,
DEPARTMENTAL MEMO ON JUVENILE DET. 2 (2009), available at www.cpoc.org/assets/General/ jdaiocprob.doc
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting an 18% drop in the Juvenile Hall detention rate and closure
of two units in Juvenile Hall but a two times increase in the number of juveniles monitored under home
supervision).
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III. FOUR LESSONS FROM TWO CASE STUDIES
What can California’s recent adventures teach us about how to evaluate
sentencing reform? Here are four lessons:
1. The aims of sentencing reform are not always obvious and not
universally shared by all who support the change. The most recent
change in California was eventually supported by a mix of advocates,
some of whom wished to reduce incarceration and many of whom did
62
not. This is far from the only instance of mixed motives in sentencing
63
reform and should be anticipated in any evaluation of effects. No
evaluation of any sentencing reform can be adequate under these
circumstances without careful analysis of the impact on the amount of
incarceration and how it is distributed.
2. Intergovernmental distributions of authority are an important and
neglected aspect of how problems arise in punishment policy and how
they can be resolved. The economic and power relations between state
and county governments were an important reason why prison
overcrowding was uncontrolled in California and an important aspect of
64
the design of a remedy. For decades, California criminal justice was the
home of what I called “the correctional free lunch.” The central
government paid 100% of the cost of prisons, but county level
government officials, prosecutors, and judges, had almost total power to
65
decide who went to prison and how long they stayed. Prior to the
determinate sentencing reforms of the mid-1970s, the central government
did have power to determine when prisoners were to be released, but this
was eliminated for the new determined terms, which were determined by
66
county prosecutors and judges. Since the additional years in prison did
not cost the counties anything, there was no incentive for them to reduce

62. Compare What We Do, NAT'L INST. ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, http://www.nccdglobal.org/what-wedo/major-projects/california-realignment-partnership (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (discussing goals to reduce prison populations), with Heather MacDonald, California's PrisonLitigation Nightmare, CITY J. (Autumn 2013), available at http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_4_californiaprisons.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing why prisoners should not be released).
63. See, e.g., id.
64. See JASMINE L. TYLER, ET AL., COST EFFECTIVE YOUTH CORRECTION: RATIONALIZING THE FISCAL
ARCHITECTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS, JUSTICE POL'Y INST., 8 (2006), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/06-03_rep_costeffective_jj.pdf (reporting that
when state levels of incarcerated juveniles peaked, the solution was to reduce the number of inmates counties
sent to state facilities).
65. See, e.g., KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 43, at 5.
66 . Cf. DAVID STEINHART AND JEFFREY A. BUTTS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL'Y CTR., YOUTH
CORRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 15 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410529_cayouth
corrections.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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imprisonment. And the central government was almost helpless to
control either the number of persons sent to prison or the length of time
67
they served when determinate sentences were used.
When population reduction became necessary in 2011, the state government
created new county responsibilities for nonviolent offenders and many parole
68
violators and paid the counties to accept these responsibilities. What impact
these funds will have on aggregate incarceration at all levels of government has
yet to be determined.
The financial strategy used in 1996 to reduce CYA commitments was to
create a monetary price the committing county would have to pay for many types
69
of juvenile offenders. And the impact of this on CYA commitments was
70
substantial. Because terms of confinement in the CYA were much longer than
in county facilities, the impact of these charges on total confinement of youth
was also substantial.
3. Money talks in intergovernmental relations. The CYA story strongly
suggests that the demand of county government for state confinement is
highly elastic. When long terms in the CYA were a free good, the
71
counties sent large numbers of offenders to the CYA. When a price was
72
charged demand went down to a small fraction of prior levels. That
imposing costs reduces the demand for CYA is no surprise, but the
extent to which imposing a price reduced commitments is an important
and not obvious lesson in the political economy of punishment. If putting
a price on commitment can reduce the CYA population by more than
90%, it is probably not wise to imagine that demand for punishment is
relatively fixed and difficult to modify.
4. There is substantial overlap between the factors and incentives that
determine the amount and distribution of penal confinement and the
73
incentives and power relations that influence many other public goods.
For all the ways that criminal punishment stands apart from the other
67. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 170 (1991) (finding
that the “decline of indeterminacy” meant that parole boards could not reduce sentences as a way to control
prison populations); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY IN CALIFORNIA 10 (1992) (surmising that California officials’ late responses to pressures that increase
prison populations lead to a sharp growth in prisoners incarnated in state facilities).
68. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 1 (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/110914_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
69. Ouss, supra note 57, at 6–7.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id, at 16.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id. at 4.
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goods and services provided by government, the variables that change
governmental behavior and the magnitude of changes that can be
produced seem to be in the normal range for public goods.
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